The Linacre Quarterly
Volume 68 | Number 3

Article 2

August 2001

Care of PVS Patients: Catholic Opinion in the
United States
Kevin O'Rourke
Patrick Norris

Follow this and additional works at: http://epublications.marquette.edu/lnq
Recommended Citation
O'Rourke, Kevin and Norris, Patrick (2001) "Care of PVS Patients: Catholic Opinion in the United States," The Linacre Quarterly: Vol.
68: No. 3, Article 2.
Available at: http://epublications.marquette.edu/lnq/vol68/iss3/2

Care of PVS Patients:
Catholic Opinion in the United States
by

Kevin O'Rourke, O.P.
and
Patrick Norris, O.P.
Rev. Kevin 0 'Rourke, o.P., founder of the Center for Health Care Ethics at
St. Louis University, is now a senior lecturer at the Center for Health and
Public Policy at the Stritch School of Medicine, Loyola University,
Chicago. He resides at St. Vincent Ferrer Priory, River Forest, IL.
Father Patrick Norris, o.P. is a staff member at Aquinas Newman Center,
University of New Mexico, Albuquerque, NM and resides there.

Members of the Catholic community in the United States often disagree
concerning the proper care of a person in a state of permanent
unconsciousness. For example, a few years ago, Hugh Finn, suffering from
brain damage incurred in an automobile accident, was the person about
whom the dispute centered. Even though they foresaw that his death would
Occur following removal of life support, his wife Michelle and one of
Hugh's sisters wanted to have artificial hydration and nutrition (AHN)
removed because "it was not helping him." Though Hugh had stated before
his accident that he would not desire life support if he were permanently
unconscious, other members of his family desired to have AHN continued.
Said Hugh's father, "[t's murder as far as I am concerned.") Even though
they were diametrically opposed, members of the Catholic community,
claiming "to speak for the Church," supported both sides of the family.
Why is there still such disagreement in regard to this issue within the
Catholic community? Usually, the official position of the Church is clear,
and though some people may disagree with the official position, there is no
doubt that they are dissenting from the official teaching and have no right
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"to speak for the Church." While general principles for removing life
support have been stated in magisterial teaching,2 there is no authoritative
magisterial teaching in regard to specific treatment of people in a state of
permanent unconsciousness,) so different theological opinions have been
formulated. This article will present the various opinions held by members
of the Catholic Church in the United States in regard to removing AHN
from people in a permanent state of unconsciousness (persistent vegetative
state, PVS). The first opinion views AHN as ordinary care and morally
obligatory. The second viewpoint contends that AHN is a medical
treatment that should be offered unless it is physiologically futile or
excessively burdensome. The third opinion states that AHN may be
discontinued in the case of the patient in PVS primarily because it offers no
benefit to the patient and secondarily because it may at times impose a
grave burden. This article will seek to evaluate these opinions, and opt for
one of them as being more in accord with the anthropology identified with
Catholic tradition.
Before examining the varying positions in the Catholic community, a
few words to explain the condition of Hugh Finn and other persons in a
permanent unconscious condition, in medical terminology often called
persistent vegetative state (PVS, although more precisely for our
discussion: permanent vegetative state), will be helpful. 4 A person in PVS
is still a human being, but functions only at the biological level. The brain
stem is often intact so the functions of respiration, digestion and bodily
homeostasis continue. In some patients however, the brain stem is partially
damaged. For these patients, if physiological function is to be sustained, a
ventilator may be necessary in order to assist pulmonary and cardiac
functions. People in a permanent vegetative state have "sleep-wake" cycles
meaning that their eyes are often open but they do not track on anything
and have no meaningful response to stimulus. Grunts and groans may also
be emitted, but they have no meaningful significance. Because of injury or
dysfunction in the cerebral cortex (sometimes called the "higher brain"),
the power to think, choose, love, and relate to others is lost. The function
of eating is also lost due to a lack of coordination between chewing and
swallowing even though gag, swallowing, and cough reflexes may be
preserved and the functions of digesting and waste elimination are
maintained. Bodily nutrition may be maintained through AHN. As far as
medical research is able to discern, withdrawal of AHN from patients in
PVS does not cause any change in pain level for the patient. s
PVS differs from other conditions such as coma, locked-in state, and
akinetic mutism. People often recover from coma, but the unconscious
condition associated with PVS is deemed to be permanent if the vegetative
state persists for longer than a year in cases of acute traumatic injury or
202
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three months in cases of non-traumatic acute injury. Recovery after such a
period of time is exceedingly rare. It seems that only a few cases of
recovery from PVS have been carefully documented; in two of these cases
the patients were unable to speak and were bedridden for the rest of their
6
Iives. Recovery may not be physically impossible, but the paucity of cases
of recovery, especially without severe impairment, allow the statement that
recovery after a firm diagnosis of PVS is morally impossible. A permanent
vegetative state then is 'a recognized medical prognosis based on
observation over the course of a given time period. "Decisions to terminate
treatment can only be reached after the PVS patient has been assessed by
repeated neurological examinations performed on successive days by a
physician experienced in the assessment of unconscious patients.,,7 For the
purposes of this article, it is presumed that an accurate diagnosis and
prognosis have been made regarding patients and that they will not recover
cognitive and affective abilities given the degree of moral certitude
possible in medicine.
Some people object to the description of patients as "vegetative" as
though it indicates they are less than human. While the term could be
understood with this connotation, it more exactly refers to the person's
ability to function only at the biological level, not to a lack of personhood
of the individual person. Cognitive-affective function, the foundation of
any spiritual activity, is not possible for a person in PVS. According to the
concept of the human person common in Catholic theology, the spirit or the
soul of the person still maintains the radical power to perform human acts
of cognitive-affective function but the actual performance of these acts is
impossible due to dysfunction in that part of the body which is necessary
for cognitive-affective function: the cerebral cortex. 8
The First Opinion

Basically there are three opinions held by people in the Catholic
community in regard to the use of AHN for patients in PVS. 9 The first
opinion looks upon the removal of AHN from a PVS patient as a serious
violation of the right to life, and often implies that removal of AHN from a
PVS patient is an act of euthanasia. '0 This opinion seems to be based upon
the fact that death will follow removal of AHN and that for some, any act
from which death follows is an act of euthanasia. Proponents of this
opinion maintain that only when a patient is in a "terminal condition" and
in "imminent danger of death" may life support be removed." As long as
AHN continues to do the job for which it was designed, to keep the person
alive, it should not be removed. This opinion seems to draw some support
from a recent statement of Pope John Paul II in Evangelium Vitae, that life
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support may be declared disproportionate or an excessive burden when
death is clearly imminent or inevitable. 12 However, this text cannot be
interpreted to allow foregoing life support only when death is imminent and
inevitable because the statement in question is taken from the "Declaration
on Euthanasia", which in accord with Catholic tradition, specifically allows
withdrawal of life support even if death is not imminent and life support is
judged to be disproportionate or imposes an excessive burden. The
document specifically asks the question: "Is it necessary in all
circumstances to have recourse to all possible remedies?" and then lists at
least five situations other than the case of imminent and inevitable death, in
which life support may be removed. 13 People who hold this opinion
frequently equate the removal of AHN with painfully "starving a patient to
14
death" or with abandoning the patient or showing disrespect for life. But
removing AHN from patients in PVS or in the last stages of an illness does
not cause the pain of hunger and thirst as it would in a healthy person who
is deprived of food and water" s Moreover, people can show solidarity and
love for loved ones by allowing them to die and praying for them when life
support is no longer beneficial, more so than by prolonging their lives when
it is not helpful for the patient. Finally, removing AHN does not mean that
the direct moral cause of death is starvation or dehydration. Rather, the
pathology which directly causes death is the dysfunction of the cerebral
cortex. Because of this pathology, the patient is unable to eat and drink on
his own. Up until the removal of AHN, the effects of this pathology have
been circumvented by use of AHN. Just as a respirator circumvents
ineffective function of the lungs, but may be removed if it does not offer
hope of benefit or imposes an excessive burden, so removal of AHN merely
allows the pathology in question to take its natural course. As Pope Pius
XII stated in 1957, the foreseen death of a patient from whom life support
is removed is an "indirect voluntary,,,16 a term used by some manualist17
theologians to signify the use of the principle of double effect.
Some
people argue that because the purpose of AHN "is not to effect a cure but
rather to keep the person alive by providing nutrition one may not withdraw
AHN on the basis that it is ineffective if, in fact, it does keep the patient
alive.,,18 However, the same thing can frequently be said of a ventilator
which often does not effect a cure yet is readily discontinued if it does not
offer hope of benefit or imposes an excessive burden. Thus, the fact that
AHN is designed to circumvent rather than cure a pathology is not relevant
to the ethical discussion concerning its use.
Occasionally, the argument is offered by proponents of this first
position that a feeding tube and nutrition are very inexpensive and
comparatively easy for the medical professionals to install so they could
never be considered an extraordinary means to prolong Iife. 19 In other
204

Linacre Quarterly

words, this opinion tends to judge whether the means to prolong life are
ordinary or extraordinary (morally imperative or morally free) in the
abstract, without reference to the condition of the patient. As Kevin
Wildes pointed out in a thorough study of the means to prolong life, this
attitude is not in accord with Catholic tradition.20 It dehumanizes the
person because it neglects the needs of the person by concentrating on the
medical therapy alone. This first opinion was popular when the Nancy
Beth Cruzan case was in the news in the late 1980s. Then its popularity
seemed to wane, perhaps as a result of several court decisions which
allowed removal of AHN from PVS patients and the opinions expressed by
several professional societies. 21 But it seems to be gaining adherents once
again as avid pro-life proponents seek to oppose any and all withdrawal of
life support and persuade people to fill out their advance directives to
22
insure that AHN will always be used, no matter what the cirucmstances.
While this opinion is often invoked by people maintaining that they are
fighting the movement toward euthanasia in the United States, others allege
that such an absolutist position disposes for euthanasia because this opinion
would allow withdrawal of life support only if death were imminent, no
matter what the quality of function or the suffering of the individual
patient.
This first opinion seems to be concerned with the physical effects of
withdrawing life support, not with the moral object as such. 23 This
difference in moral evaluation is well expressed by the statement of the
Pro-Life Committee of the National Conference of Catholic Bishops
(PLC):
We should not assume that all or most decisions to withhold or
withdraw medically assisted nutrition and hydration are attempts to
cause death. To be sure, any patient will die if nutrition and hydration
are withheld. But sometimes, other causes are at work, for example,
the patient may be imminently dying, whether feeding takes place or
not, from an already existing terminal condition. At other times,
although the shortening of the patient's life is one foreseeable result
of an omission, the real purpose of the omission was to relieve the
patient of a particular procedure that is of limited usefulness to the
patient or unreasonably burdensome for the patient and the patient's
family or caregivers. This kind of decision should not be equated
with a decision to kill or with suicide (emphasis added).24
Ultimately, the underlying conviction of people who hold this first
opinion seems to be that AHN for PVS patients is not a medical device or
medical treatment, but merely comfort or normal care which would be
moral1y obligatory when physiological1y effective. 25 The aforementioned
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opinions of medical societies, as well as the medical expertise needed to
install AHN, and the fact that AHN does nothing to increase the comfort of
the patient contradicts this conviction.26

Tbe Second Opinion
The second opinion extant in the Catholic community does not
prohibit the removal AHN from patients in PVS. However, as we shall see,
in its interpretation of "hope of benefit" and "excessive burden," it does
limit the criteria which may be used for removal. This opinion was
expressed most authoritatively in 1992 by the PLC and is held by some
theologians and philosophers,27 but was never adopted by the
Administrative Board of the National Conference of Catholic Bishops
(NCCB) nor by the NCCB as a whole. It is of considerable importance
within the Catholic community in the United States as a pastoral statement,
even though the PLC does not promulgate doctrinal statements. While the
document of the PLC "repeats solid principles," it also contains
"contingent and conjectural elements," which mitigate its doctrinal
authority.28 As the PLC itself declared, the document states "the first
word" which may be revised before the " last word" is spoken. Briefly, this
opinion may be expressed in the words of the Committee:
.... it is our considered judgment that while legitimate Catholic
debate continues, decisions concerning these patients (PVS) should
be guided by a presumption in favor of medically assisted nutrition
and hydration. A decision to discontinue such measures should be
made in light of a careful assessment of the burdens and benefits of
nutrition and hydration for the individual patient and his or her
family and community. Such measures must not be withdrawn in
order to cause death, but they may be withdrawn if they offer no
reasonable hope of sustaining life or pose excessive risks or burdens
(emphasis added).29

There is no dispute in the United States Catholic community in regard
to teaching and theology concerning the intention of removing life support.
It must not be to kill the patient, but rather to stop doing something
disproportionate (no hope of benefit) or to benefit the patient by removing
a burdensome therapy (remove an excessive burden). In traditional
Catholic theology, evidence that people act ethically when removing life
support is drawn either from "no hope of benefit" or from "excessive
burden." "No hope of benefit" simply means that the goods for which one
seeks medical therapy are not forthcoming from the therapy; "excessive
burden" means that any benefits forthcoming from use of a therapy are

206

Linacre Quarterly

outweighed significantly by the burdens. Burdens may be spiritual,
psychic, and economic as well as physiological. These criteria are stated in
the Ethical and Religious Directives for Catholic Health Care Services
(ERD),30 a document prepared by the United States Bishops to maintain
ethical standards in the provision of health care in Catholic health care
facilities. If the medical therapy offers hope of benefit and does not impose
an excessive burden, it is called an ordinary or proportionate means of
preserving life. If it either offers no hope of benefit or imposes an
excessive burden, it is called an extraordinary or disproportionate means to
prolong Iife.31
While there is agreement in theory concerning the general norms for
removing life support, when applying the criteria to particular situations,
the PLC and the theologians who agree with them adopt a narrow
interpretation of "hope of benefit" and "excessive burden." They consider
the prolongation of life in the PVS condition as an "intrinsic good" and a
"great benefit.,,32 According to this interpretation, if life can be prolonged
for PVS patients through the use of AHN, it must never be withdrawn or
withheld on the grounds that it is not providing a benefit to the person.
Thus, in the previously cited passage, the PLC translates "no hope of
benefit" as "no reasonable hope of sustaining life." For practical purposes
then, if the AHN is prolonging life, "doing its job" as some theologians
maintain,33 only the criterion of excessive burden may be used to withdraw
life support. The notion of life being "an intrinsic and great good" is
included in the PLC document and other statements of bishops and
theologians but it seems to stem from the moral theory of Germain Grisez,
which holds that human life as such is an incommensurable good, and that
people who deny this assertion are professing dualism. 34 Both Ralph
McInerny and Benedict Ashley, prominent Thomists, reject Grisez's
interpretation because it misconstrues the notion of natural inclination and
subordination of proximate goals to ultimate goals. Ashley observes: "the
human body is human precisely because it is a body made for and used by
intelligence. Why should it be dualism to unify the human body by
subordinating the goods of the body to the good of the immaterial and
contemplative intelligence?,,35
Insofar as excessive burden is concerned, the proponents of this
second opinion make an effort to consider only the burden that might be
connected directly with the use of AHN,36 not the burden that might follow
from the use of the therapy for the patient, the family or society, as is
allowed in the ERD (Directives 56 and 57). Moreover, the Catholic
tradition understands that "excessive burden" may arise from economic and
psychic causes as well as from physiological causes. Overall then, the
opinion expressed by the PLC and the theologians who agree with them is
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rather limited insofar as removal of life support from PVS patients is
concerned. Moreover, it is clear that many bishops in the United States do
not agree with this opinion, especially when they are called upon to give
guidance in specific cases.37
While it does not correspond exactly to the theological
presuppositions of the second opinion, and is more akin to the first opinion,
there is a growing tendency among proponents of the second opinion to
define AHN as a form of "normal or comfort care" not subject to the
above-mentioned ethical criteria.38 Normal care is described as care which
is always required; for example, keeping the patient comfortable, changing
bed clothes, and avoiding bed sores. According to proponents of this
theory, AHN is not a medical procedure or device, because it is not utilized
in order to prolong life but rather in order to keep the patient comfortable,
or because each person has a right to food and water. This opinion is
directly contrary to declarations of several medical societies and legal
39
opinions which explicitly declare that AHN is a medical procedure.
Moreover, the use of AHN for all patients in the dying process has been
40
called into question recently in prestigious medical journals.
Even if
AHN were not a medical procedure, it does de facto prolong life, no matter
what it is called. For this reason, it should be evaluated ethically according
to the two aforementioned criteria: hope of benefit and degree of burden.
Recently, the Holy Father mentioned the PLC document in an ad
!imina address to bishops from the Western United States. 41 This led some
people to maintain that the Holy Father was proposing a clear teaching that
AHN could not be removed from PVS patients because it offered "normal
care.,,42 This is an overreaction to the papal statement. While the Holy
Father seems to affirm the principles expressed by the PLC, especiaIly the
principle of not removing life support with the proximate intention of
causing death (finis operis) , it would be rash to maintain that he was
correcting bishops who have affirmed the third opinion or approved the
43
actions of their parishioners who acted in accord with the third opinion.
The Pope maintains that AHN should be provided "to all patients who need
them." However, he offers no clarification as to how to assess necessity in
the concrete situation. Clearly, holders of both the second and third
opinions agree that AHN should be provided when ethicaIly necessary.
While not a definitive statement of doctrine then, the Pope's ad /imina
address affirms the principles stated in the PLC document and implies that
the opinion of the Committee is "safe in practice" but it cannot be
maintained that the third opinion is rejected. 44
Finally, the actions of several State Catholic Conferences question the
rational consistency of the second opinion. Many states have advance
directives which allow persons through proxy decisions to decline the use
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of AHN, if the person is ever in a state where he cannot make health care
decisions for himself. 45 If there must be a presumption to prolong the life
of a person in PVS unless there is evidence that prolonging life in this
condition is an excessive burden, why is it that State Catholic Conferences,
always under the direction of the bishops in the state, have accepted
advance directive legislation without any serious objection?
The Third Opinion

The third opinion is held by many Catholic theologians and ethicists
who work in clinical settings and by many medical societies who have
studied the issue.46 In addition, this opinion has been followed by some
bishops who have been called upon to offer opinions in regard to well
publicized cases in their dioceses. 47 The opinion follows the traditional
admonition that the death of the patient must not be the proximate intention
of the persons either requesting the removal of life support or removing it
from the patient. But it also maintains that once a firm prognosis of
permanent unconsciousness has been made, AHN may be removed. This
third opinion uses both of the criteria for removing life support, originated
by Catholic theologians at Salamanca, Spain, in the 16th century: namely,
hope of benefit to the patient or excessive burden to the patient, his or her
family, and to the community which is involved in caring for the patient. 48
The essential difference between the second and third opinions is that
those who hold the third opinion maintain that continuing life support for
people with a PVS diagnosis does not offer "hope of benefit" for the
patient. Proponents of both the second and third opinion agree that the
proximate intention of the people removing life support must not be to end
the life of the patient. But the proponents of the third opinion maintain that
the continued existence of the patient who is permanently unconscious
offers objective evidence that life support may be removed because it is
disproportionate or unnecessary.49 Proponents of this position support their
opinion by referring to the purpose of health care and the purpose of life.
Health care seeks to enable people to strive for the purpose of life, not
merely to function at the biological level. 50 Ultimately, the purpose in life
is friendship with GOd. 51 Recall in another era we would answer the
Catechism question, "Why did God make you?", with the response, "To
know Him, love Him, and be happy with Him in this life and the next." To
know, love, and be happy requires cognitive-affective function. If a person
does not have the potential for cognitive-affective function, it does not
mean that God does not love him or her or that the person is no longer a
friend of God. But it does mean that the person cannot pursue the
friendship of God, the purpose of life, through his or her free actions.
August, 2001

209

Therefore, the moral imperative to help the person toward health and
existence is no longer present if there is no potential for cognitive-affective
function and treatment offers no palliative benefit. The truth of this
explanation is confirmed by the care given to anencephalic infants in
Catholic hospitals. Their lives could be prolonged, maybe even for a few
years, but no care outside of comfort care is given because they do not have
the capacity for cognitive-affective function. This manner of treatment has
been approved by a recent statement of the Doctrine Committee of the
NCCB in the United States.52
St. Thomas Aquinas gives the foundation for declaring that friendship
with God requires cognitive-affective function when he distinguishes
between a human act (actus humanus) which requires the activity of the
intellect and will, and acts of the body (actus hominis) which are
accomplished by our autonomic nervous system (bodily functions), not
under the direction of our intellect and wilL 53 Our ultimate goal, the
purpose of life, is acquired only through human acts, not through acts of the
body which are independent of the intellect and wilL 54 People who are not
able to perform acts of cognitive-affective function because of some
pathology are not less human, but the moral mandate to help them prolong
their lives is no longer present because they will never again perform
human acts, that is, acts proceeding directly from the intellect and will.
Clearly people in this condition, as in the case of anencephalic infants, may
not be directly put to death nor mistreated in any way, but life support that
keeps them alive need not be continued because it does not offer them any
hope of benefit.
Clinical experience attests to the fact that families have a very
difficult time giving permission to remove life support from their loved
ones, even if they are permanently unconscious. The decision is not made
unless it is clear the life support is not beneficial or imposes a severe
burden. As the statement of the PLC quoted above maintains: " ... although

the shortening of the patient's life is one foreseeable result of an omission,
the real purpose of the omission was to relieve the patient of a particular
procedure that was of limited usefulness to the patient or unreasonably
burdensome for the patient and the patient's family or caregivers
(emphasis added).,,55 When questioned, families affirm that because
medical technology is no longer useful, their proximate intention is to
discontinue an inappropriate therapy, thus contributing to the well-being of
their loved ones. The foreseen death of the patient from whom life support
is removed because it is not effective is "an indirect voluntary." In other
words, when AHN is removed from a patient in PVS, the principle of
double effect is invoked.56 The act of removing a therapy or a medical
device which is disproportionate or excessively burdensome is a good
210
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moral act because the moral object of the act is to remove what has been
judged to be an inappropriate treatment. However, the act has two effects,
one foreseen and intended in the moral object; the other, foreseen but not
intended as part of the moral object. In fact, if it were possible to achieve
the first effect without the second one, the person acting would avoid
placing the action from which the unwanted effect follows. Finally, this
third opinion is based upon the belief that there is life after death, when, as
the liturgy of the Church maintains in the preface for the Mass for the
Dead, "life is changed, not ended." Thus, allowing a person to die when
life support offers no hope of benefit to the patient or imposes an excessive
burden is simply surrendering to God's Providence and accepting the fact
that human life is not an absolute good. Proponents of this opinion do not
ask whether life can be prolonged, but rather, should it be prolonged?

Conclusion
Given the various opinions, what opinions seem safe in practice? The
first does not seem viable because it seems to prohibit the removal of AHN
in all circumstances. As directives 56 and 57 of the ERD indicate, there are
some situations in which life support may be removed. The second and
third opinions seem viable insofar as the general principles for removing
life support are concerned. People will judge which is the more fitting way
to care for patients in PVS in accord with the rationale that we have
explained for opinions two and three.
Do both the second and third opinions fall within the realm of Church
teaching? It would seem that they do, because as the Bishops of the United
States declared in the Ethical and Religious Directives: "The NCCB
Committee on Pro-Life Activities . . . points out the necessary distinctions
between questions already resolved by the Magisterium and those that
require further reflection, as for example. the morality of withdrawing

medically assisted hydration and nutrition from a person who is in the
condition which is recognized by physicians as the persistent vegetative
All three opinions present in
state (PVS) (emphasis added).,,57
contemporary Catholicism in the United States insist that the intention to
remove life support must not be to kill the patient. However, the second
and third opinions contradict the first opinion because both allow for the
withdrawal of life support in certain circumstances in accord with the
traditional teaching of the Church. The second opinion, however, limits in
practice the application of the traditional teaching by maintaining that life
in PVS is a "great benefit" and that the burdens which would justify the
removal of life support do not include the burdens which AHN imposes
from its very nature. The third opinion is based upon the teleological
gUst,2001
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aspects of medicine and human life. If the purpose of human life can no
longer 'be obtained, it seems that no hope of benefit will come from medical
therapy. The difference between the second and third opinions seems to
stem ultimately from different theological and philosophical
anthropologies. As explained above, the third opinion would not conceive
of life in a PVS condition as beneficial for the patient because he or she is
no longer able to strive for the purpose of life and will not regain this
ability. When this ability is present, or may be actualized in the future,
then friends, family and society have an obligation to offer health care and
life support to the debilitated person, if doing so does not impose an
excessive burden.
The third opinion does not differ in principle from the second opinion.
Both clearly view euthanasia as intrinsically evil. The opinions differ
mainly in their assessment of what constitutes "hope of benefit." At times,
the debate about the utilization of AHN for patients in PVS has been a
contentious one within the Catholic community in the United States.
However, much of the acrimony in the dispute could be eliminated by
recognizing that the resolution of the debate hinges on an irenic
examination and discussion of theological anthropology, including further
delineation and understanding of what is beneficial for the human person
based on the purpose and sanctity of human life.
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